The present invention relates to a method for identi fying subscribers and for generating and verifying elec tronic signatures in a data exchange system working with processor chip cards, using identification data coded in a center with respective subscriber-related known ciphers and stored in the respective chip card and with secret ciphers having a logical relationship to the known ciphers, whereby random number-depend ent check data are mutually exchanged between the subscribers.
2. Description of the Prior Art Important prerequisites for data security in modern communication systems are: (a) the mutual identification of the communicating partners participating in the system; (b) the authentication of the transmitted and stored data;
(c) the coding of the transmitted and stored data; and (d) checking the authorship of the transmitted data. As is known, a high degree of data security can only be achieved by utilizing cryptographic methods that enable an identification and authenticity check of mes sages, subscribers and equipment beyond all doubt. What is generally understood by cryptography is a coding of the data for secrecy purposes. In addition to this doubtlessly-important crypto function, however, other functions, particularly checking the authenticity and authorship or generating electronic signatures are gaining increasing significance.
Symmetrical or asymmetrical coding algorithms can be employed for realizing cryptographic functions. Given a symmetrical algorithm, for example the DES algorithm (data incryption standard), identical keys are employed for coding and decoding. Symmetrical cryp tosystems are particularly suitable when larger data sets have to be transmitted at a high rate. By contrast, disad vantages derive due to a relatively difficult cryptoman agement because the transmitter and the receiver must have the same key and a reliable channel is required for the transmission of the key respectively employed.
In asymmetrical cryptosystems, different ciphers are employed for coding and decoding, such that, for exam ple, the key for coding is known and the key for decod ing is secret. The latter is only known to the receiver. On asymmetrical cryptosystems, for example, the RSA algorithm named after the inventors Rivest Shamir and Adlemann that requires a comparatively high techno logical outlay and correspondingly long run times de pendent on the length of the cipher employed but that satisfies high security requirements on the basis of the special cryptosystem. The asymmetrical cryptosystem is ideally suited for assigning a message to be transmit ted. The message to be signed is thereby coded with the secret key of the signee and can be decoded by anyone that knows the public key. This "electronic signature' not only contains the personal feature (possession of 65 private or secret key of the signee but also involves the signed text, with the consequence that the receiver recognizes any change in the text. Message and signa 2 ture are therefore invariably linked via the key algo rithm.
The utilization of modern cryptographic equipment is intimately connected to the introduction as what are referred to as multi-functional processor chip cards.
The processor chip card not only enables versatile ap plications but is also employed for accepting the neces sary security components (secret key and cryptoal gorithm) in order to guarantee an identification of the user and a reliable authentication of the card and of the message exchanged.
Presently known algorithms for electronic signatures, particularly the RSA algorithm (in this connection see U.S. Pat. No. 4, 405, 829) , fully incorporated herein by this reference or the algorithm developed by A. Fiat and A. Shamir (European patent application Ser. No. 0, 252, 499) require either a high memory outlay or, inso far as they can be accommodated at all in the chip be cause of extensive and complicated arithmetic opera tions, particularly, multiplications, require a great deal of time, so that they are only conditionally suitable for utilization in chip cards.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
It is therefore an object of the invention to provide methods for mutual identification of subscribers of data exchange systems and for generating signatures that, given essentially the same security guarantees, enable shorter run times due to more simple arithmetic opera tions, in comparison to known cryptographic methods.
The above object is achieved, according to the pres ent invention, in a method for mutual identification of subscribers in a data exchange system working with processor chip cards, utilizing identification data coded in a center with respective subscriber-related known keys and stored in the respective chip card and with secret keys having a logical relationship to these known keys, whereby random number-dependent check data are mutually exchanged between the subscribers, and is particularly characterized in that the chip card sends the coded identification data, potentially together with a signature of the center, to the subscribers entering into an information exchange with the chip card, this sub scriber checking the correctness of the coded identifica tion data with reference to a known list or with refer ence to the signature of the center, then proceeding from a random, discrete algorithm re(l, . . . , p -1), where p is a declared prime number modulus, the chip card forms an x value according to the rule x:=2(mod p) and sends this x value to the subscriber, after which the subscriber sends a random bit sequence ess (eixi. . . , etc.k)e(0,1}k to the chip card, and by multiplication of the stored secret key si that likewise represents a dis crete logarithm with a binary number formed from the bits of the random bit sequence e transmitted from the subscriber to the chip card and by addition of the ran dom number r allocated to the previously-transmitted x value, the chip card calculates a number y according to and checks the identity of the chip card user on the basis of a comparison between the calculated number x and the x value previously communicated to the subscriber. According to another feature of the invention, the method is particularly characterized in that the chip card calculates a x value according to the rule x:=27(mod p) from a random number r generated in the chip card and lying in the range between l and the prime number modulus (p-1), that the chip card calcu lates a random bit sequence as a function of the x value of the message m and of a declared hash function h according to the rule e:=h(x, m)"{0,1}k, that the chip card calculates a y value from the random number r, from the secret ciphers sistored in the chip card and from the random bit sequence e according to the rule k t (mod p-1) r = r --is si S. ei 2-l y 11 it and that the chip card sends the message m and the signature formed from the value x and y to the sub scriber in message communication with the chip card. According to another feature of the invention meth ods can be accelerated by discrete logarithms calculated in a preliminary process and intermediately stored, whereby values once employed are combined in a ran dom fashion with other discrete logarithms in a rejuve nation process. This is exemplified by a method of the type set forth above which is particularly characterized in that a plurality of random numbers r, and respec tively appertaining x values calculated in a preliminary process are stored in pairs in the chip card, in that the pair (r, x) employed in an identification procedure and /or signature procedure is varied in such a manner that a random number r, after use thereof, is combined with a random selection of the remaining stored random numbers, and in that the rejuvenated random number calculates the appertaining x value and is stored and/or used together with the rejuvenated randon number r as a rejuvenated pair.
A method for verification of a signature generated according to the second-mentioned feature is particu larly characterized, with respect to the subscriber re ceiving the signed message m, in that: a random bit sequence e is calculated from the mes sage m and from the x value of the signature according to the rule e:=h(x,m)e(0,i}k, that an x value according to the rule k (mod p) x = 2y at vi i ei 2 j= i is is calculated from the random bit sequence e, from the public key v and from they value of the signature and is checked to see whether the calculated x value coin cides with the x value of the signature. With respect to rejuvenation, according to another feature of the invention, a method is particularly char acterized in that a plurality of random numbers r1, ..., rk and their appertaining x values, Xu = 2 (mod p), are stored in the chip card, and in that the pair of numbers (r, x) used in an identification procedure and/or signa ture procedure is rejuvenated in the following manner by a random selection (rat), Xa(i)) of the pairs for i=1,.
. . , t (mod p-1) ge"gld --i ra(ii) 2. (mod p) x". = ld xico.
According to another feature of the invention, a method is particularly characterized by such a selection of the prime number modulus p that (p-1) is divisible by a prime number q and by such a selection of the base a of the discrete logarithm that applies, and in that the discrete logarithms y, r, sj are calculated modulo q, and in that the key components si and v are in the relationship vi=aj(mod p). Then a plays the role of the base 2 above.
According to another feature of the invention, a method is particularly characterized by such a selection of the secret key si and of the random numbers r that the bit lengths of the numbers si, r and y are shorter than the length of the prime number modulus p.
According to another feature of the invention, a method is particularly characterized in that other finite groups are employed for the formation of discrete loga rithm instead of the finite groups that arise on the basis of residual class formation modulo p.
According to another feature of the invention, a method is particularly characterized in that a group of units Zn" of the invertible residue classes modula a com posite number n, a group of units of a finite body, an elliptical curve over a finite field or the like are pro vided as a finite group. Then this finite group plays the role of the group Z'.
According to another feature of the invention, a method for verifying an abbreviated signature gener ated according to the third-mentioned feature at the subscriber receiving the signed message m, is particu larly characterized in that:
a number x is calculated from the transmitted message m and from the signature (e, y) according to the rule k (mod p) t x = 2 r yix ei 2-1, j= is and that a check is carried out to see whether the e value of the signature coincides with the value h (x, m).
The problem to be solved in practicing the present invention is comprised in the difficulty of calculating the discrete logarithm. Other, known asymmetrical cryptomethods are also constructed on this foundation (for example reference may be taken to T. Eurocrypt '88 Abstracts, . Compared to the known cryptomethods, the present invention has the advantage that the arithmetic operations can be com paratively more simply executed in the chip card. This occurs particularly due to the set preliminary process. This preliminary process can also be combined with the mentioned cryptosystems of ELGAMAL, CHAUM EVERTSE-van de GRAAF and BETH. In addition, especially short signatures can be generated in practic ing the present invention.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Other objects, features and advantages of the inven tion, its organization, construction and operation will be best understood from the following detailed descrip tion, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, on which: FIG. 1 is a 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
In FIG. 1, an example is illustrated how a subscriber A, for example a chip card belonging to the subscriber, proves his identity vis-a-vis a subscriber B, for example a chip card terminal.
In a data exchange system working with chip cards, the respective user-related chip cards are issued by one or, potentially, more classification centers (government representatives, credit card companies or the like), whereby the issue of the chip cards is not instituted until the identity of the respective user has been checked. The center then prepares a personal identification string I for a qualified user (name, address, ID number, etc), attaches the user-related, public key to this identifica tion string I, this key having potentially been generated by the user himself, and publishes the pair formed of identification string I and the public key v in a publical ly-accessible list. The center itself does not see the se cret keys and can therefore likewise not disclose the same. The identification string I, the public and secret keys v, is as well as a declared prime number pare stored in the chip card before the card is issued.
Instead of using a public list, the center can sign each pair (I,v) . This signature is stored in the chip card and can be easily checked with the assistance of the public key of the center. After the chip cards and/or the public list have been issued, no further interaction with the center is necessary, neither for generating nor for checking signatures and identifications.
The identification begins with what is referred to as an initiation. The subscriber A or, respectively, the chip card thereby sends an identification string I and the public key v to the subscriber Bor, respectively, to the appertaining terminal that verifies the identity. Differ ing from known cryptomethods, the public key is veri ship between the public key v and the identification string I and monitors the signature of the center in this manner. The public key v = (vt. . . VR) has a logical relationship to the secret key s-(si...sk) and is defined 2S vi=2 f(mod p) for j= 1,..., k, where p is a prime number that is at least 512 bits long.
As soon as the secret key s is selected, the correspond ing public key v can be easily calculated. The inverse process-calculating the secret key s from the public key v-13 cannot be implemented because the calculation of the discrete logarithm modulo p for such large prime numbers p is beyond the range of present computers and algorithms. The components of the secret cipher is the discrete logarithm modulo p of fiti, i.e. sj= -log2 (mod p-1) for j= 1,...,k.
All discrete logarithms refer to the group ZZ" (the multiplicative group modulop) and, insofar as not oth erwise noted, to the base 2. Since the order of the group Z' is p-1, the discrete algorithm assumes the value 1, 2, ...,p.-1. Instead of the finite groups that arise due to residual formation modulo p, other finite groups can also be employed for the formation of the discrete loga rithm, such as, for example, the group of Zn" of invert ible residue classes relative to a composite number n, the group of units of a finite field, an elliptic curve over a finite field, etc. Knowledge of the group order is not required for transferring the method to an arbitrary finite group. For example, it is adequate to calculate with the discrete logarithms on the order of magnitude of 240.
After the initiation, the subscriber A generates in record step a random number re(1, . . . , p-l), with the corresponding exponential value x = 2 (mod p).
The inverse arithmetic process, i.e. calculating the ran dom number r from the x value is extremely difficult insofar as p is adequately large. The subscriber B there fore has practically no possibility of discovering the random number r in the time available to him. This x value calculated at the subscriber A is transmitted to the subscriber B, i.e. to the terminal. Like the aforemen tioned secret keys, the random number r is a discrete logarithm. Following therefrom is that calculations at the side of the chip card are carried out with discrete logarithms and are carried out with the corresponding exponential value at the cooperating side, i.e. in the terminal of the subscriber B.
Generating the random number r and the exponential value x = 2 (mod p) derived therefrom can be advantageously accelerated by a preliminary process that offers and regenerates a supply of a plurality of pairs each composed of a ran dom number r and the appertaining x value in the chip card. This supply can be set up in the chip card itself or can be externally loaded into the chip card. In an initi ated identification process, one of these pairs can there fore be immediately accessed, so that the respective x value can be immediately transmitted to the subscriber B.
In the next step, the subscriber B now sends a random bit sequence e=(el. . . . . ek)e(0, 1}k to the subscriber A or, respectively, to the chip card.
After receiving the random bit sequence e, the chip card sends a linear combination of the secret key si stored therein-a linear combination dependent on the bits of a random bit sequence e-, adds the current random number r thereto and transmits the numerical The subscriber B now checks whether the y value sent to him is the correct answer to the question raised, the subscriber A having been asked this question by the subscriber B sending the random bit sequence e. In this check, the subscriber B calculates the right-hand part of the following equation. By incorporating a message n, the described identifi cation of the subscriber. A can be expanded into an electronically-generated signature of the subscriber A under the message m. This electronic signature allows the subscriber B to document the identity of the sub scriber A vis-a-vis a third party, for example a judge. In addition to this, it allows the proof that the subscriber A has signed the message m beyond all doubt. The follow ing steps must be carried out ( see FIG. 2) in order to sign a message m given utilization of the secret key si stored at the subscriber A, i.e. in the chip card:
1. The subscriber A again selects a random number r and, as already set forth in conjunction with the identity check, calculates a x value according to the relationship x = 2 (mod p).
Here also, of course, there is the possibility of accessing the stored supply and directly calling in the random numbers r and the appertaining x value. 3. Finally, the subscriber A calculates a y value from the components of the secret key s, random bit se quence or, respectively, hash value e and random num ber r according to the relationship k (mod p-1) t X. ei 2". is The number pair x, y then yields what is referred to as the electronic signature of the message m. The two security numbers k and t preferably lie in the range between 1 and 20. They yield a security level 2k, i.e. at least 2k multiplications (modulo p) are needed for coun terfeiting the signature or, respectively, the identity.
For example, k=1 and t=72 yields a security level 272 that is adequate for signatures.
Proceeding on the basis of this signature formed by the number x and y, whereby both numbers are at least 512 bits long, various possibilities of abbreviating the signature derive. One of the possibilities provides that the number x be replaced by the hash value e=h (x, m) that is only 72 bits long. The signature is now composed of only y and evalues (see FIG. 4) . A next step is com prised in no longer taking the numbersy, r, si in the size of the modulo p, but of only small numbers for y, r, si that, however, are at least 140 bits long for the security level 272. An especially simple possibility of achieving short signatures is comprised therein that the prime number modulus p is selected such that a second prime number q divides the value (p-1), whereby q is 140 bits long. The base 2 is then replaced by a number a, so that applies. It follows therefron that all discrete logarithms can be calculated modulo q, i.e. logarithms for the se lected number a are calculated, whereby all logarithms can then lie in the range from 1 through q. This has the advantage that a number that is smaller than q derives for the y value of the signature. Proceeding from the random number r retl, ...,g-1}, Only relatively slight calculating tasks must be pro duced in the chip card both in the identification proto col and the signature protocol. Although the secret key sy must still be multiplied by relatively small numbers in calculating the number y, this multiplication can be resolved into simple additions and shift events, what are referred to shifts, whereby the product of s and et merely has to be shifted i-1 positions toward the left. The random number r, finally, is then to be attached to this intermediate result by addition.
Although the calculation of the number x=2 (mod p)
is also involved, it can be practically neglected in terms of time expenditure due to the aforementioned prelimi nary process when x values corresponding to a few random numbers are calculated in advance and a plural ity of pairs of numbers composed of r values and x values are stored as a supply. In order to prevent having the same number of pairs being used over and over again at regular intervals given a limited plurality of pairs, a rejuvenation is car ried out insofar as each pair, after use, is subsequently combined with other, potentially all pairs of the supply, in particular again in a random fashion. The result thereof is that the supply is rejuvenated and varied over and over, little by little.
As an example of such a rejuvenation, let it be as sumed that a supply of k number pairs (ri, x) is present for i=1 ...,k. In order to renew the pair (rv, xv) random indices a(1), . . . , a(t-1)et1,...,k}, for example, are selected, as is a pair (ru, x) that has just been rejuve nated and the new pair (rv, xv) is calculated with a(t)=u. In the rejuvenation, the selection a (t)= u has the result that a number r that was just rejuvenated is mul tiplied by the highest power of 2. This leads to an espe cially effective rejuvenation of the supply. It is advanta geous to employ a pair (r, x) as a signature that is formed as a random combination of the pairs just stored. Inter mediate values that arise anyway given the rejuvenation of rv, xv are well suited for this purpose.
Of course, these rejuvenation processes for the pair (r, x) can be combined and varied. The only matter of consequence is that the rejuvenation occurs as quickly as possible and cannot be duplicated from the signatures that have been performed. A small numbert is thereby expediently employed; the rejuvenation cannot be dis covered when the supply of numerical pairs-i.e. the number k-is adequately large. It is advantageous to co-employ the key pairs si vi in the rejuvenation; for example, a cipher pairs, v) can be selected for a num ber pair (ra(1), xa(i)). Given t = 6 and k = 10, the rejuve nation of a number pair requires only 6 or, respectively, 12 multiplications that can be implemented more or less incidently, for example when no other arithmetic opera tions are to be executed in the terminal.
The versatile possibilities of rejuvenating the number pairs (r, x) can be differently used in each chip card.
For example, the indices a(1), . . . , a(t31 1) and the combination of the cipher pairs of the supply can be differently fashioned in each chip card. A discovery of the rejuvenation process is practically impossible in this ale.
In the case of the abbreviated signature, the random numbers rimust be small so that they part of the signa ture also remains small. This is achieved in a simple manner in that the base a for which a 140 bit long prime number q is selected for the discrete logarithms, so that a4 = 1 (mod p) is valid. The rejuvenation of the random numbers ri, of course, is then calculated modulo q, i.e. the modulus p-i is replaced by the modulus q.
Although I have described my invention by reference to particular illustrative embodiments thereof, many changes and modifications of the invention may become apparent to those skilled in the art without departing
